Deterrence of nuclear use through the threat of retaliation could be highly problematic in many plausible conflict scenarios with nucleararmed regional adversaries. This could compel U.S. leaders to temper their military and...

Buy Now From Amazon

Deterrence of nuclear use through the threat of retaliation could be highly problematic in many plausible conflict scenarios with nucleararmed regional adversaries. This could compel U.S. leaders to temper their military and political objectives if they come into conflict with these states. This book examines the reasons behind this important shift in the international security environment and its strategic and force planning implications.

Similar Products

On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st CenturyPsychology and Deterrence (Perspectives on Security)Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice (Stanford Security Studies)Every War Must End (Columbia Classics (Paperback))Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of SafetyThe Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford Nuclear Age Series)Cyberdeterrence and CyberwarArms and Influence: With a New Preface and Afterword (The Henry L. Stimson Lectures Series)